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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Capturing  financial  network  linkages  and  contagion  in  stress  test  models  are  important  goals  for  banking
supervisors  and  central  banks  responsible  for micro-  and  macroprudential  policy.  However,  granular  data
on  financial  networks  is often  lacking,  and  instead  the  networks  must  be reconstructed  from  partial  data.
In this  paper,  we  conduct  a horse  race  of  network  reconstruction  methods  using  network  data  obtained
from  25  different  markets  spanning  13 jurisdictions.  Our  contribution  is two-fold:  first,  we collate  and
analyze  data  on a  wide  range  of  financial  networks.  And  second,  we  rank  the methods  in  terms  of  their
ability  to reconstruct  the  structures  of  links  and  exposures  in  networks.
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In the era prior to the global financial crisis, banking supervisors
followed a microprudential approach to assessing the resilience
of banks. As such, the first generation of bank stress-test models
tended to focus on individual banks’ solvency risks, while remain-
ing silent on the issue of liquidity risk, and ignored interlinkages
within banking systems. However, as the crisis attests, the failure
to capture these features led to an underestimation of the risks to
financial systems in many advanced economies.
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Interbank 13 Brazil, BIS, Canada, Denmark,
Eurozone, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Mexico (x3), Netherlands
Payments 5 Brazil, Mexico (x3), US
Repo 2 Denmark, Mexico
FX 1 Hungary















































The crisis spurred much reflection over the reasons behind the
xplosive growth of interlinkages in the financial system in years
rior to the crisis (e.g., Billio et al., 2012; Merton et al., 2013). At the
ame time, bank supervision authorities and central banks have
een busy developing new stress-testing models and tools that
ore rigorously account for the interconnections between banks
nd the interactions between banks’ liquidity and solvency risks.1
n particular, models of financial network contagion have become
opular as they can shed light on the risk transmission mechanisms
ithin financial systems. For example, banks that have suffered
olvency shocks may  cut lending to their counterparties. These
ounterparties, in turn, anticipating the cut in funding, will also cut
ending to their counterparties, and so on. Depending on the struc-
ure of the network and distribution of initial shocks, such hoarding
ay  lead to a freeze in interbank markets.2
Employing network contagion models in stress tests requires
ranular data on both the credit exposures and funding structures
f financial institutions. Yet the collection of granular micro-level
ank data is patchy across countries. Indeed, a crisis is often needed
o spur data-reporting efforts. For example, after the 1994 Mex-
can peso currency crisis, the Banco de México started collecting
etailed information on daily exposures both among domestic
anks and from domestic to foreign banks. Similarly, in response
o the global financial crisis, the G-20 set up the Data Gaps Initia-
ive in 2009 to strengthen the reporting and collection of financial
ata by member countries. However, while data-gathering capabil-
ties have improved markedly, frequent data on bilateral linkages,
hich are needed to operationalize network contagion models, is
ften lacking.
To overcome the data limitations, several methods have been
eveloped to reconstruct financial networks from available aggre-
ate data. The methods vary in terms of the emphasis placed on the
etwork features to reproduce. Some methods, for example, seek
o minimize the exposures of individual links, while others seek to
inimize the number of links required. The methods also vary in
heir outputs: some produce unique reconstructed networks, while
thers generate a distribution of possible networks. To date, the dif-
erent methods have been tested and validated using partial data
rom very different periods and financial markets, which renders
ny comparison between them difficult.In this paper, we present the results of a joint exercise, spanning
3 jurisdictions and 25 different financial markets, to comprehen-
ively analyze the performance of different network reconstruction
1 Examples include the European Central Bank’s “Stress-Test Analytics for
acroprudential Purposes in the Euro area” (STAMPD ) and Bank of Canada’s “Macro-
inancial Risk Assessment Framework” (MFRAF).
2 See, for example, Gai et al. (2011) and Lee (2013). As an alternate mechanism,
awadowski (2011) consider how information asymmetries make it costly for a
ank’s creditors to monitor the quality of the bank’s assets following a solvency
hock, which can lead to an endogenous withdrawal of liquidity. Stability 35 (2018) 107–119
methods.3 The reconstruction process is as follows. For the markets
analyzed, we have access to actual data and thus known the true
bilateral links in the financial networks. However, for each market,
we postulate that the only information available is the aggregate
asset and liability positions for all banks. This information is fed into
the different methods, which reconstruct the network of bilateral
exposures. Summary statistics for the properties of the reconstruc-
tions are recorded, as well as estimates for how similar they are to
the true financial networks. In the end, a ranking of the different
methods is produced by comparing their performance across the
different financial markets.
A key challenge in running the horse race stems from the
confidentiality of the data, which prevents their sharing, espe-
cially across jurisdictions. To overcome this issue, we devise a
de-centralized approach to running the horse race, wherein a suite
of code is run on data provided by a participating jurisdiction, and
only a summary of the results is communicated publicly. This mech-
anism ensures that there is no violation of data confidentiality while
facilitating a meaningful comparison of results across jurisdictions.
We find that the winner of the horse race depends on the feature
of the network that we seek to preserve during the reconstruction.
This, in turn, is captured by our choice of similarity measure. In par-
ticular, those measures that emphasize reproducing the structure
of links between financial institutions favor methods that pro-
duce more sparse networks. In contrast, similarity measures that
emphasize reproducing bilateral exposure sizes favor methods that
allocate exposures as evenly as possible.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that doc-
uments a cross-country and cross-market comparison of financial
network data, together with a comparison of network reconstruc-
tion methods. In two  related and recent papers, Mistrulli (2011) and
Anand et al. (2015), the authors compare stress-test outcomes on
Italian and German interbank markets, respectively, where the net-
works are reconstructed using two different methods. We  consider
the methods and markets analyzed by these authors, as well.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the different financial markets we consider, as well
as our panel analysis (detailed market summaries are provided in
Appendix A). Section 3 provides brief summaries of the different
network reconstruction methods and similarity measures we  con-
sider (further details in Appendices B and C). The results of our
horse race are provided in Section 4, and a final section concludes.
2. Summary of the financial network data
Our horse race stems from the liquidity stress testing work
stream of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS’s)
Research Task Force (RTF) which has published a series of reports
BCBS (2013a,b, 2015). A new area of focus for the work stream
is macro prudential stress testing, with particular emphasis on
integrating liquidity, solvency and systemic risks into stress-test
models. With particular reference to network analysis, the work
stream has written that (emphasis ours) “network analysis and agent
based models [prove] useful for broadening stress tests, as these mod-
els consider contagion through common exposure, interbank funding
relationships and the endogenous behavior of banks”  (BCBS, 2015).
Operationalizing these models requires granular data, which is
inferred using network reconstruction methods. To evaluate the
performance of these methods, the RTF authorized a collaborative
effort across several jurisdictions with two key objectives.4 The
first, to collect and analyze data on financial networks across the
3 We thus do not describe the use of these results as in van Lelyveld and Liedorp
(2006), for example, or survey them as in Upper (2011) and Hüser (2015).
4 See BCBS (2015) for further details.
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Table  2
Description of interbank network data.
BIS1 BR01 CA01 DE01 DK01 EU01 HU01 IT01 KR01 MX01 MX03 MX06 NL01
Number of nodes 31 111.9 6 592.4 14 26 35.8 535.4 18 43 43 43 159
Number of links 742.7 512.7 29.5 11623.5 77 197.7 274.8 3158.9 263 408.3 127.3 53.3 546.1
Density 79.9 4.1 98.3 3.3 42.3 29.2 22.2 1.1 85.9 22.6 7.1 3 2.2
Average degree 24 4.6 4.9 19.6 5.5 7.6 7.7 5.9 14.6 9.5 3 1.2 3.4
Median degree 25.3 2.2 5 14.7 5 8.4 7.8 3.2 15 9.3 2 1 1
Assortativity −.19 −.37 −.6 −.3 −.33 −.31 −.43 −.17 −.22 −.23 −.39 −.49
Clustering 28.5 4.4 67.3 40.3 21.5 15.5 22.2 19.1 21.2 12.9 5.9 4.3 6.6
Lender dependency 28.7 65.2 35.8 43.6 37.5 71.2 32.4 71.6 31.6 54.6 71.7 84.6 78.6
Borrower dependency 30.6 59.8 40.2 69.4 39.6 71.1 39.4 87.8 24.9 51.8 61.6 74.8 76.2
Mean HHI assets .16 .5 .26 .3 .27 .46 .24 .64 .19 .39 .47 .54 .54
Median HHI assets .15 .44 .25 .22 .25 .35 .14 .61 .17 .33 .42 .6 .57
Mean HHI liabilities .16 .38 .29 .59 .25 .56 .25 .84 .15 .36 .33 .24 .48
Median HHI liabilities .13 .31 .26 .59 .23 .6 .11 1 .14 .26 .25 0 .45
Core  size (% banks) 73.1 9.8 76.7 6.6 42.9 36.3 31.5 3.5 77.8 31 16.3 7 6.5
Error  score (% links) 3.5 41.3 1.4 12.5 14.3 12.2 22.1 22.8 3.4 24.7 39.4 55.2 25.2
Number of slices 3 12 10 12 1 9 12 10 1 3 3 3 10
Note: The table shows the average over all network slices available (bottom row). The definitions of the metrics are given in Appendix C.
Table  3
Network statistics for remaining networks.
Payments CDS Repo Other
BR02 MX07 MX08 MX09 US01 MX05 UK01 US02 DK02 MX02 HU02 MX04
Number of nodes 100.9 43.3 43 43.3 5733 43 336.3 985 12 43 148.6 43
Number of links 1604 734.3 229.7 476.7 180917.5 135 1856.8 4298.3 18 62.3 533.5 84.7
Density 15.8 40.3 12.7 26.3 .6 7.5 1.6 .4 13.6 3.5 2.4 4.7
Average degree 15.9 17.1 5.3 11.1 31.6 3.1 5.5 4.4 1.5 1.4 3.6 2
Median degree 10.2 15.7 3.3 8.3 10.5 1.3 1 2 .5 .7 1 .7
Assortativity −.5 −.44 −.3 −.42 −.27 −.18 −.71 −.81 −.73 −.21 −.61 −.17
Clustering 18.7 17.3 6.8 11.9 14.3 6.1 7.4 17.6 3.5 4 3.7 4.6
Lender dependency 59.9 50.8 61.2 47 59.6 71.1 64.2 72.1 71.4 75.6 76.4 67.1
Borrower dependency 65.8 53.5 61 58.5 59.9 71.8 66.4 74.5 95.1 68.9 72.9 66.7
Mean HHI assets .48 .36 .35 .22 .44 .39 .37 .52 .32 .37 .56 .28
Median HHI assets .4 .29 .23 .16 .37 .35 .21 .5 .11 .28 .7 .07
Mean HHI liabilities .53 .4 .37 .38 .47 .39 .48 .36 .84 .26 .57 .24
Median HHI liabilities .46 .28 .23 .26 .41 .24 .41 .18 1 0 .6 0
Core  size (% banks) 22.2 42.6 22.5 34.9 2.7 15.5 5.3 1.6 16.7 9.3 7.5 10.9





















Number of slices 10 3 3 3 2 
ote: The table shows the average over all network slices available (bottom row). T
urisdictions, and the second, to test the performance of network
econstruction methods using the collected data.
Table 1 provides an overview of the financial networks we
overed. The majority of these are interbank networks.5 This is
ollowed by payments networks and several other networks for
ifferent financial contracts: repurchase agreements, i.e., repos,
oreign exchange derivatives (FX), credit default swaps (CDS) and
quities. For many networks, we also analyze several consecutive
ime-shots. Further details on the time frames and other institu-
ional information are provided in Appendix A.
Table 2 summarizes the properties of the interbank networks.6
s can be seen, the networks vary greatly in their size and other
roperties. The German interbank network (DE01), for example,
as on average 592 banks (with over 11 thousand links), while the
anadian network (CA01) only includes the 6 major banks (with
 link count below 30). The density of the networks ranges from
lmost fully connected, with 96.7% (CA01) to very sparse, with only
5 For Mexico, we disaggregated the interbank network into three different net-
orks, each for a different financial instrument. A similar disaggregation is carried
ut for the Mexican payments networks.
6 See Appendix C for a description of the different network properties we compute.
e  group the metrics in the tables into those that are binary-based and those that
re  weight-based.3 4 3 1 3 10 3
nitions of the metrics are given in Appendix C.
1% of the links for the Italian network (IT01). Another interesting
feature is the core size, which is a proxy for tiering in the market.
The fewer the banks in the core, the more tiered is the interbank
market. Across our sample of interbank markets, the core size varies
from 3.5% of banks (IT01) to 77.8% for the Korean network (KR01).
Table 3 summarizes the properties for the remaining networks.
Fig. 1 provides scatter plots showing the relationships between
the size of interbank networks and their density, market diversity,
and core-size. We measure a network’s size as the logarithm of the
number of nodes it has. We  measure market diversity as the inverse
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for interbank assets and
liabilities (Baumgärtner, 2004). We  readily note the following: large
interbank networks tend to have a low density, a low diversity,
and only a small number of financial institutions in the core. One
interpretation for these results is that interbank networks are tiered
networks. Additionally, we  observe that in general, the larger the
network, the more pronounced is the tiering: only a few – core –
financial institutions are tightly interlinked, and intermediate on
behalf of all other financial institutions.7
7 Formally exploring the tiering structure of interbank and, indeed, other types of
networks is beyond the scope of this paper, and we leave it as possible future work.
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Fig. 1. Relationships between network size and selected network characteristics.
Table 4
Overview of network reconstruction methods.
Authors Code Category Description
Anand et al. (2015) Anan Sampling Minimises the number of links necessary for
distributing a given volume of loans
Baral and Fique (2012) Bara Iterative Exposure sizes drawn from a copula fitted to
the aggregate exposures of all banks
Cimini et al. (2015) Cimi Sampling A fitness model determines the likelihood of
directed linkages and exposures
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) Dreh Iterative Postulates that the network should have a core
of  banks with large exposures between
themselves, and a periphery of other banks
with smaller exposures
Halaj and Kok (2013) Hala Sampling Links are drawn at random, where all links
have an equal probability, and exposures are
assigned according to an iterative procedure










Musmeci et al. (2013) Musm 
. Network reconstruction methods
The number of new financial network reconstruction methods
s growing rapidly. We  concentrate on seven, which we selected
arly on in the process after a comprehensive search of published
ethods. The most important selection criteria are, first, that the
ethod should be able to reconstruct the network based only on
ggregate positions and, second, that the code can be fitted in our
odular suite of Matlab codes.8
8 The full set of codes, our results, and the networks descriptives are available at
ttps://github.com/imanvl/RTF NTW Horse.git.ampling A fitness model determines the likelihood of
undirected linkages, and exposures are
allocated via Maxe
The methods can be broadly classified into two  categories. The
first one, labeled ‘Iterative,’ starts with an initial guess for the net-
work. The entries in the network are then repeatedly re-scaled until
the aggregate positions satisfy their targets (henceforth, referred to
as the ‘marginal constraints’). The methods in this category differ
in their initial assumptions regarding the structure of the network.
The three methods in this category have the following mnemonics:
Bara, Dreh and Maxe. The second category, labeled ‘Sampling,’ con-
sists of methods that use Monte Carlo sampling and other heuristics
to generate financial networks. There are four methods in this cat-
egory: Anan, Cimi, Hala and Musm.  Table 4 provides an overview
of the seven methods included followed by short descriptions.
Full technical details are provided in Appendix B. Note that in
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Table  5
Similarity measures.
Metric Category Description Range
Hamming Link Sum over all links of the difference between
the original and reconstructed networks
[0, ∞)
Jaccard Link Inverse of the number of links belonging to the
original and reconstructed networks divided
by  the number of links that belong to at least
one network
[0,1]
Accuracy Link Percentage of true-positive and true-negatives
links in the reconstructed network relative to
the original network
[0, 1]
Cosine  Exposure Cosine of the angle between the original and
reconstructed networks
[0, 1]
Jensen  Exposure Jensen-Shannon divergence between original
and reconstructed networks, normalizing all








ig. 2. Density. Note: Density is defined as the number of realized links over the to
elative  density ranging from green to red. (For interpretation of the references to c
ur implementation Anan, Bara, Hala and Maxe generate only sin-
le reconstructed networks while Cimi, Dreh and Musm produce a
eries of reconstructed financial networks (i.e., ensembles).
Anan reconstructs networks with the smallest number of links,
hile still satisfying the marginal constraints. Additionally, thember of possible links (excluding self loops). The cells are shaded according to the
 this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
method shapes the network to be disassortative, i.e., banks with
large aggregate positions will be linked to banks with small aggre-
gate positions. Bara consists of three steps. First, the aggregate
positions for the financial institutions are fitted to a multivariate
copula distribution. Second, financial networks are sampled from
112 K. Anand et al. / Journal of Financial Stability 35 (2018) 107–119


















ig. 3. Borrower dependency. Note: Borrower dependency is defined as the averag
re  shaded according to the relative borrower dependency ranging from green to re
o  the web version of this article.)
he copula. Finally, the rows and columns of the sampled networks
re re-scaled until the marginal constraints are satisfied. The re-
caling is achieved using the Maxe method.
In Cimi, the probability for a link between any two  banks
ncreases in their pre-specified ‘fitness scores’. The method pro-
eeds in two steps. First, a directed (binary) network of links
etween institutions is generated based on their fitness scores. The
eights are then assigned to the links, also according to the fitness
cores. Importantly, the marginal constraints are only binding on
verage. Thus, while marginal constraints may  be violated for indi-
idual network realizations, the constraints will be binding when
e average over a large number of network realizations.
Dreh generates networks with ‘core-periphery’ structures.9 As
n initial guess for the network, the method assumes there are a
ew institutions (the core) with large exposures between them-
elves. Other institutions (the periphery) have smaller exposures,
9 The core-periphery model was first proposed by Craig and von Peter (2014). See
n ’t Veld and van Lelyveld (2014) for a cross-country comparison.e market share of the largest borrower over total borrowing and lending. The cells
 interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred
and tend to link to core institutions. These initial networks are
re-scaled using the Maxe method.
Hala samples links between institutions, where all links are ex-
ante assumed to be equally likely. The exposure that is allocated
to the link between institutions i and j is equal to institution j’s
aggregate position scaled by a term drawn at random from the
unit interval. The method iterates until all aggregate position con-
straints are satisfied.
Maxe is the basis for all other iterative methods. In the ini-
tial guess network, institution i’s exposure to institution j is the
product of i’s aggregate interbank asset position and institution j’s
aggregate interbank liability position. This network is subsequently
re-scaled by the aggregate positions, first along the rows and then
the columns, until the aggregate position constraints are satisfied.
Bacharach (1965) proves that, as long as the initial network is ‘con-
nected,’ the re-scaling always yields a unique network that satisfies
the marginal constraints. A connected network is one where each
financial institution has at least one link with another institution.
Finally, the Musm method is similar to Cimi in that the probabil-
ities of observing links are based on fitness scores in both methods.
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F ealize
















ig. 4. Percentage of true-links. Note: true-links are defined as the percentage of r
he  relative true-links ranging from green to red. (For interpretation of the referenc
owever, in Cimi, the underlying adjacency matrix is directed,
hile for Musm it is undirected. Further, the assignment of expo-
ures under Musm follows the Maxe method, while for Cimi it does
ot.
. The horse race
The financial network data we consider are confidential, and
heir sharing is restricted. To overcome these restriction, we devise
 de-centralized approach to run the horse race of network recon-
truction methods. In particular, a suite of codes is applied within
 jurisdiction by participating researchers, who  report the results
o the wider group. The suite consists of two parts: network recon-
truction and similarity estimation. We  treat each one in turn.
.1. ProcedureWe  focus on reconstructing networks when the only informa-
ion available is on the aggregate positions. These reconstructed
etworks are then compared with the true networks, also available
o us. While restrictive, using only the aggregate positions ensuresd links also found in the reconstructed network. The cells are shaded according to
olor in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
that we  treat all the methods equally. For each jurisdiction, we  first
select the market and a particular date, and subsequently perform
the following:
• Compute aggregate positions for financial institutions.
• Reconstruct the network based on the aggregate positions using
the seven methods.
• Compare the reconstructed networks with the true one and com-
pute similarity scores.
Members shared the similarity scores and the descriptives for
the true networks across jurisdictions. As described below, the
similarity measures are aggregate statistics from which the true
financial networks cannot be inferred.
4.2. Similarity measuresWe consider six similarity measures, where the first five can be
classified into two groups: link-based and exposure-based. Link-
based measures capture whether the presence or absence of a link
in the true network is reproduced in the reconstructed network. We
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F tage o



















ig. 5. Percentage of true non-links. Note: true-non links are defined as the percen
ccording to the relative true-links ranging from green to red. (For interpretation o
his  article.)
onsider three measures in this category: (i) Hamming distance, (ii)
accard score, and (iii) Accuracy score. Exposure-based measures,
n the other hand, take into account the size of links and check
hether these have been faithfully reproduced. We  consider two
easures in this category: (i) Cosine measure and (ii) Jensen score.
Our sixth measure is based on DebtRank, which is a model for
nterbank contagion (Battiston et al., 2012). The DebtRank for a
articular financial institution is a measure of the aggregate inter-
ank assets of all institutions that are at risk from the failure of
he single institution. We  order all financial institutions based on
heir DebtRank scores and compute the rank correlation between
he ordering of institutions in the true network versus the recon-
tructed networks.
Table 5 provides an overview of the measures, along with a brief
escription. Note that for consistency, we have re-based the Ham-
ing and Jensen measures so that, for all metrics, higher values
orrespond to greater similarity. In what follows, we report on the
verage values for the similarity measures over the time horizon of
rue network observations for each jurisdiction.f absent links also not present in the reconstructed network. The cells are shaded
eferences to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
4.3. Summary of results
We  begin by comparing the outputs of the different network
reconstruction methods using standard network-based measures
(a full summary of these measures is provided in Appendix C). Fig. 2
provides a heat-map that compares the density of the true networks
with the reconstructed networks for all jurisdictions and markets.
The performance of each method is measured by how close its color
matches that of the actual network (first row). Not surprisingly,
there is a large variation among jurisdictions from dense to sparse
networks. From the estimated matrices, we observe that Anan, Cimi,
Hala and Musm tend to estimate sparse networks for most jurisdic-
tions, while Bara, Dreh and Maxe estimate denser networks.
A similar broad classification of results can be seen for borrower
dependency (Fig. 3), which measures the reliance of individual
banks on their largest creditor. The larger the borrower depen-
dency, the more concentrated the network is. Once again, the Anan,
Cimi, Hala and Musm methods produce more concentrated net-
works than the Bara, Dreh and Maxe methods.
Further insights into the performance of the different methods
can be gained from the estimates for the true links, i.e., links that are
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Table  6
Horse race results for deterministic methods.
Country Type Code Hamming Accuracy Jaccard Cosine Jensen DebtRank
BIS IB BIS1 maxe maxe bara
Brazil IB BR01 anan anan hala maxe hala maxe
PAY  BR02 anan anan bara bara bara
Canada IB CA01 maxe maxe maxe
Germany IB DE01 anan anan anan maxe hala maxe
Denmark IB DK01 hala hala maxe maxe
REP DK02 anan anan anan hala anan
Eurozone IB EU01 anan anan maxe bara hala
Hungary IB HU01 anan anan maxe maxe bara
OTH  HU02 anan anan anan maxe maxe anan
Italy  IB IT01 anan anan anan maxe hala bara
Korea IB KR01 maxe bara maxe
Mexico IB MX01 anan anan bara bara bara
REP  MX02 anan anan hala bara anan bara
IB  MX03 anan anan maxe anan maxe
OTH  MX04 anan anan bara bara bara
CDS  MX05 anan anan maxe maxe maxe
IB  MX06 anan anan hala bara anan maxe
PAY  MX07 hala hala maxe bara bara
PAY  MX08 anan anan maxe maxe bara
PAY  MX09 hala hala maxe maxe bara
Nethlerlands IB NL01 anan anan anan maxe anan bara
UK  CDS UK01 anan anan anan maxe maxe *
US  PAY US01 hala hala anan bara hala bara
































ote: for each network we first compute the average over all available time slices a
lank.  For the CDS networks we have no results for the DebtRank metric (marked w
he  probabilistic methods, since Cimi is the clear winner.
resent in the true and reconstructed networks, and true non-links,
.e., links that are absent in both the true and reconstructed net-
orks. As Fig. 4 demonstrates, the Bara, Dreh and Maxe methods are
uccessful in identifying links among banks that are present in the
riginal networks. This is a consequence of the methods estimating
omplete networks.
On the other hand, the Anan, Cimi, Hala and Musm methods cor-
ectly identify which links are absent in the original networks (high
alues in Fig. 5). This stems from the fact that these three methods
end to produce sparse networks. However, in sum, the accuracy
f the various partial network methods is ambiguous, as it weighs
oth true links and true non-links equally.
.4. Horse race league table
In presenting our results we face the challenge that some algo-
ithms produce an ensemble of networks while others produce
 single matrix. This makes a straightforward comparison diffi-
ult. Fortunately the Cimi method is the clear winner between the
nsemble methods.10
The horse race results for methods that produce unique net-
orks are summarized in Table 6.11 Each row corresponds to a
ifferent network. The last six columns indicate the ‘winning’ meth-
ds for each of the different similarity measures. If, however, there
as no clear winner, i.e several methods performed equally well,hen the cell has been left blank.
The winner in Table 6 crucially depends on the feature of the net-
ork that we are most keen to preserve. This, in turn, is reflected by
he choice of the similarity measure. If, for example, we are focused
10 It is worth noting that both the Anan and Hala methods can also be extended to
roduce ensembles of networks. However, for our analysis, we focus on the cases of
ingle realizations.
11 For each network, we first compute the average over all available time slices
nd then we run the horse race. We also tabulate the results if we first run the race
or each available slice and then find the mode across slices. The latter results are
ot  materially different.n we run the horse race. If two  or more methods win jointly then we leave the cell
 *) because capital buffer data is not available. We do not include a similar table for
on reproducing the structure of links, then from the link-based sim-
ilarity measures – Hamming distance and Accuracy score – we  note
that Anan is the clear winner across all financial networks with Hala
as the runner up. The Anan method seeks to minimise the number
of links required to allocate the aggregate positions of all financial
institutions. The method, thus, focuses on reducing the incidence
of false-positives, i.e., reconstructing a link that is not present in
the true network. This, however, may  be countered by a higher
incidence of false-negatives, i.e., not reconstructing a link when it
is present in the true network. However, as the results suggest,
the Anan method’s ability to reduce the number of false-positives
gives it a clear advantage over the other methods under link-based
similarity measures.
If we focus on reproducing the structure of bilateral exposures,
then from the exposure-based similarity measures – Cosine and
Jensen – an altogether different picture emerges. These metrics
compare the allocated exposure sizes in the reconstructed net-
works with the true networks. For the Cosine measure, we find
that the Bara and Maxe methods perform best across all networks.
There are two possible explanations for this result. First, for many
of the financial institutions in each data market, a large fraction
of the links are of an equal size. Second, the average link size is
roughly similar to the aggregate exposure divided by the number
of financial institutions. For the Jensen score, we  find that the Maxe
method is the clear winner.
Finally, for the DebtRank correlation measure, we find that the
Bara method is the winner, with Maxe coming in as a close sec-
ond. Insofar as both these methods are also the top performers
for the exposure-based similarity measures, this suggests that the
DebtRank contagion mechanism does not depend so much on the
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. Conclusions
Capturing financial network linkages and interbank contagion
n stress-test models are important goals for central banks tasked
ith oversight of macro-prudential policy. The operationalization
f these models, however, requires granular financial network data,
hich is often unavailable. In this paper, we conduct a horse race
f methods to reconstruct financial networks from partial data. The
inner of the horse race depends on the network feature we are
ost keen on reproducing.
As such, we derive the following rules of thumb: focusing – first
 on deterministic methods, if we seek to preserve the structure
f links and expect the network to be sparse, then Anan is the best
erforming method. If, however, we are more interested in repro-
ucing the structure of exposures, then Bara or Maxe tend to be the
est performers. Finally, if our emphasis is more on financial stabil-
ty, in that we seek to maximize the rank correlation of DebtRank
cores, we find that Bara is the winner. Second, if our focus is on
robabilistic methods, we find that Cimi is the clear winner across
ll measures of interest.
A byproduct of our horse race is the collation of summary statis-
ics – both point estimates and distributions – for a wide range of
nancial networks.12 Consistent definitions for the network statis-
ics are used and computed for the different networks. This, in
urn, facilitates a meaningful comparison of the different networks,
hich was previously not possible. For many networks, we  also col-
ect up to 12 consecutive snapshots. Such data may  be of use to the
ider financial network research community, who could use our
tatistics to generate realistic networks for their own research.
ppendix A. Summary of the data
In this appendix we provide a summary of all the financial
arkets analyzed. The data are categorized according to their juris-
iction.
Bank for International Settlements The network constitutes
he exposures between different national financial systems in
013Q4. We  derive the network from the International Banking
tatistics (IBS, locational by residency), which the Bank for Interna-
ional Settlements (BIS) has been collecting since the late seventies
see the BIS website for further details). The data has also been stud-
ed in a network context (e.g. Fender and McGuire, 2010; Minoiu
nd Reyes, 2013; Garratt et al., 2011).
Both domestically owned and foreign-owned banking offices
ith significant external claims in the reporting countries report
heir on-balance sheet positions on other countries split out by
ector (residency concept). A wide range of claims is included (e.g.,
tandard loans and deposits, repurchase agreements, i.e., repos, and
everse repos, certificate of deposits, financial leases, promissory
otes, subordinated loans, debt securities, and equity holdings and
articipations). Out of the possible reporters, data availability leads
s to include 21 countries.13
Brazil Two types of networks are analyzed: the interbank expo-
ures and the national payments system network.Interbank exposures: This network is formed by exposures
etween banking or non-banking financial institutions in the
razilian interbank market and is analyzed by Cont et al. (2010).
hese institutions are either financial conglomerates or isolated
12 As mentioned, the full set of codes, our results, and the networks descriptives
re  available at https://github.com/imanvl/RTF NTW Horse.git.
13 Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Germany,
reece, Denmark (excl. Faeroe Islands and Greenland), Spain, Finland, France (incl.
onaco), United Kingdom (excl. Guernsey, Isle of Man  and Jersey), Ireland, Italy,
apan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States. Stability 35 (2018) 107–119
institutions that do not belong to a conglomerate. Data are monthly,
from January to December 2012. These networks are formed by
aggregating, without netting, the end-of-month interbank market
exposures for pairs of financial institutions, regardless of instru-
ment and time to maturity. The instruments included in these
exposures are unsecured interbank deposit operations (59% in vol-
ume), debentures (23%) and repos collateralized with securities
issued by the borrower (18%). The average number of market partic-
ipants is 112 (maximum, 115). They are sparse (maximum density
is 4.3%)
Payments system:  The Brazilian Payments System (BPS) provides
services for the settlement of obligations involving transfers of
funds, securities and foreign currencies and has previously been
analyzed by Miranda et al. (2014). The system is segmented accord-
ing to the target market and the type of assets traded. The system
component selected for this study is the network of the Reserves
Transfer System, which is an real-time gross settlement system
(RTGS) that provides the backbone of the BPS. The network par-
ticipants are banks that hold bank reserves accounts at the Central
Bank of Brazil and non-banking institutions, that hold, when autho-
rized, settlement accounts. Daily snapshots are considered from
January 16th to 27th in 2012. These networks have, on average, 101
participants (maximum, 102). The payments’ networks are denser
than the interbank ones (minimum density of the period is 12.5%)
and present more disassortative behavior.
Canada The networks considered are monthly observations
of interbank exposures between the six Canadian domestic sys-
temically important banks, from June 2014 to March 2015.14 The
bilateral exposures are constructed by aggregating over six differ-
ent interbank instruments as reported by the banks: (1) bankers’
acceptances, (2) debt securities holdings,(3) lending (drawn and
undrawn), (4) over-the-counter derivatives (potential future credit
exposure), (5) repos (before collateral), and (6) deposits.
The total interbank exposures as a fraction of their Common
Equity Tier 1 capital ranged between 10% and 60% across bank-
month pairs. The ratios of total interbank assets to total (liquid)
assets ranged between 0.7% (7%) and 4% (59%).15
Denmark Two types of networks are analyzed: overnight inter-
bank loans and repo transactions. Snapshots for both markets come
from December 2011.
Overnight interbank loans: The network is constructed using
data from the Danish large-value payment system (Kronos) whose
members include all Danish banks. This market has previously been
analyzed by Amundsen and Arnt (2012). An algorithm similar to
Furfine (1999) is used to in order to isolate transactions connected
to the deliveries and returns of overnight money market loans.
Repo transactions: Major firms, including financial institutions,
are required to report their end-of-month outstanding repo agree-
ments vis-à-vis every other domestic institution. Repos with
foreign institutions are reported on an aggregate basis. The net-
work considered is thus the net bilateral repo exposure (excluding
collateral) between Danish banks.
Eurozone The network constitutes bilateral exposures between
the 26 largest banking groups that are domicile in the Eurozone. A
banking group’s size is measured in terms of its aggregate trading
securities position, which includes long- and short-term debt and
equity. The data are derived from the Securities Holding Statistics
Group (SHS-G) database. The SHS-G data specifies the portfolio for
14 A description of the reporting standards can be found at http://www.osfi-bsif.
gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rtn-rlv/fr-rf/dti-id/Pages/imer.aspx.
15 Liquid assets are defined as: cash, cash equivalents, t-bills and other short-term
paper issued or guaranteed by Canadian governments. Note that, even though the
full network is complete at the aggregate level, there is some variation in the strength




























































Fedwire participants without net debit caps are excluded from
the analysis. Participants with a net debit cap of 0 are included; thisK. Anand et al. / Journal of Fin
ach banking group at the level of individual securities. The quar-
erly slices span from September 2013 through December 2015.
Netherlands The network is constructed using data on bilateral
ransactions gleaned from the TARGET 2 large-value payment sys-
em on April 6th 2010. This was a typical day without any stress
r extraordinary operational event. For this exercise we focus on
he overnight market and thus leave out all longer maturity loans.
uilding on Furfine (1999), Arciero et al. (2016) have developed a
ethodology to identify loans with price and maturity information.
he transaction-level data set thus has the time, volume and price
f all transactions involving at least one Dutch bank. This data has
een analyzed further in Blasques et al. (2015).
Germany Quarterly data from March 2013 to December 2015 is
sed on interbank loans in the German banking system. The net-
ork consists of German banks with total assets above 1 billion
uros on a consolidated basis at the respective reporting date. Those
anks capture approximately 95% of the total assets of the Ger-
an  banking system. The data is derived from the national credit
egister, which includes bilateral exposures covering loans, bonds,
erivatives and guarantees. Until the end of 2014, only exposures
bove 1.5 million euros based on the group of borrowers were
eported, while the respective reporting threshold was lowered to
 million euros at the beginning of 2015. The data previously been
nalyzed by Anand et al. (2015).
Hungary Two types of networks are considered: interbank
eposits and currency swaps.
Interbank deposits: The Hungarian interbank deposit market is
he main market for Hungarian banks to manage their liquidity and
he only market where they have direct credit risk against each
ther. The Central Bank of Hungary has been collecting data on this
arket since 2003. The dataset contains detailed information on
very transaction (e.g., the name of both counterparties, the start
nd end dates of the transaction, the size and the interest rate of the
ransaction). Twelve consecutive monthly networks from July 2007
o June 2008 are considered. Currency swaps:  Ten monthly snap-
hots of FX swap transactions from June 2007 to April 2008 are
onsidered. This market is one of the most important Hungarian
nancial markets. The Central Bank of Hungary obliges Hungar-
an credit institutions to report all of their foreign currency related
ransactions including FX swaps. The majority of the foreign cur-
ency contracts are US dollar denominated (roughly 82%) and a
inor proportion in euros (roughly 15%) and Swiss Francs (less than
%).
Korea The interbank exposures are constructed using banks’
ounterparty information collected from the flow of funds and
urveys on interbank transactions in 2012Q4. These cover all the
n-balance sheet items such as deposits, lending, repo transac-
ions and debt issuance of all 18 domestic banks. However, only
xposures with a remaining maturity of less than three months are
ncluded. Thus these bilateral interbank exposures can be suitable
or analyzing the structure of short-term interbank transactions.
Italy Monthly data from December 2013 to September 2014 is
sed to gather data on outstanding bilateral, unsecured, short-term
nterbank loans between banks domiciled in Italy. Short-term inter-
ank loans include overnight deposits, certificates of deposit, other
eposits and other borrowings.
Mexico Several networks are considered in the analysis: inter-
ank exposures (unsecured loans, FX transactions, derivatives
ransactions), repo transactions, cross holding of securities and
ayment systems flows. The networks were drawn for three dif-
erent dates: 31st October 2008, 28th June 2013 and the 30th June
014. These networks have previously been studied by Martínez-
aramillo et al. (2014) and Poledna et al. (2015).
Interbank exposures networks: These networks are generated by
ggregating unsecured interbank loans, net positions from out- Stability 35 (2018) 107–119 117
standing derivatives transactions and cross holding of securities
between pairs of banks.
Payment systems networks: The payment system flow net-
works are divided in three different networks: the total flow, the
large-value payments and the low-value payments networks. In
Mexico, the large-value payment system accepts both low-value
and large-value payments. The individual payment records include
information on the purpose of the payment. This means that the
payment may  be done between two banks for transferring an unse-
cured interbank loan, this payment is classified as a large-value
payment. On the other hand, the payment may  be the result of a
money transfer between two clients in two different banks, and
this is classified as a small-value payment.
Outstanding derivatives exposures, outstanding interbank deposits,
loans and credit lines, outstanding call money transactions and cross
holding of securities: These networks can be seen as layers of the
total exposures network.
Outstanding repo loans: This network only considers the total
amount of an outstanding repo position between two banks. The
collateral is not taken into account; this means that the weight of
the links is the total amount lent by one bank to another, consider-
ing all the outstanding derivative transactions between them. This
implies that many repo transactions are consolidated in one link
regardless of the type of security used as collateral, the residual
maturity or the premium.
United Kingdom The networks are created using Trade Infor-
mation Warehouse data from the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation (DTCC). The data used pertain to transactions among
reporting counterparties on single-name CDS contracts where the
reference entity is a UK firm. A detailed description of the UK CDS
market is provided in Benos et al. (2013).
Two  different types of networks are constructed from these data.
First, for a selected date at the end of June 2010, two networks of
gross notional exposures are generated by aggregating all outstand-
ing trades across (1) 30% and (2) all reference entities, respectively.
Second, following Ali et al. (2016), four monthly snapshots of net-
works of notional exposures, denominated in euro, from June 2010
to September 2010 are generated for CDS contracts referring to the
largest 66 reference entities.
Over time the number of counterparties varies between 331 and
345, and properties such as network density, average degree, clus-
tering coefficient and assortativity appear to be stable. All networks
considered have low density, small average degree and negative
assortativity.
United States Two networks are analyzed: the payments net-
work and CDS network.
Payments network: Fedwire Funds is the RTGS system operated
by the Federal Reserve System. In Fedwire, payments are identi-
fied by the ABA number (routing transit number) of the sender and
receiver. Banks may  maintain multiple ABA numbers for use when
sending and receiving payments. However, each bank must des-
ignate one of its ABAs as its “master” account. For this analysis,
payments sent and received by sub-accounts are attributed to the
master account.
The data used to measure the importance of and size of each
participant is the net debit cap (i.e., maximum allowable uncollat-
eralized daylight overdraft), which is only available at the master
account level. The Federal Reserve calculates the net debit cap
by multiplying a bank’s qualifying capital by its appropriate cap16 There are several levels of cap multiples, detailed at www.clevelandfed.org/
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ap indicates that a bank should not incur any daylight overdrafts.
uring the week of the sample period, at least one payment was
ent or received by 5722 unique master accounts.
CDS network: Positions on CDS exposures over three weekly
napshots covering September 5, 12, and 19, 2014 are used in this
xercise. Our sample includes both centrally cleared and bilateral
ontracts. The data are obtained from DTCC, which makes its Trade
nformation Warehouse available to the Office of Financial Research
nder a written agreement. Positions used in this study include all
xposures on single-name and index CDS contracts where the ref-
rence entity is US-domiciled (in the case of single names) or North
merican domiciled (in the case of indices), or where at least one
f two counterparties is US-domiciled. On any given date, approx-
mately 900-1000 counterparties trade positions on 3500 to 4000
nderlying reference entities. From this data we have constructed
 complete network of counterparty exposures.
ppendix B. Network reconstruction methods
The standard approach in the literature is to estimate the matrix
f bilateral links (denoted by X) by the so-called maximum entropy
ethod (Upper, 2011; Elsinger et al., 2013). This entails maximizing







typically a firm’s total assets, Ai, and liabilities, Li, to all other par-
icipants), relative to prior information (Qij) on bilateral exposures,
f available. As entropy is a measure of probabilistic uncertainty, this
pproach is optimal when selecting a probability distribution in the
ense of using least information (MacKay, 2003). Entropy optimiza-
ion is widely used across disciplines (Fang et al., 1997), and can be
mplemented by efficient iterative algorithms, which can be gen-
ralized to handle additional constraints (Blien and Graef, 1997;
lsinger et al., 2013).
.1 Anan
In Anand et al. (2015), the authors propose an approach which
ombines information-theoretic arguments with economic incen-
ives to produce networks preserving the realistic characteristic of
nterbank networks. The authors argue that interbank networks are
parse given that interbank activity is based on relationships. The
inimum Density (MD) approach is formulated as a constrained
ptimization problem. Let c represent the fixed cost of establishing
 link, N be the number of banks, X the matrix of bilateral gross expo-
ures, Xij represents the exposure of bank i to bank j, the aggregated
nterbank assets of bank i are
∑N
j=1Xij and its aggregated liabilities
re
∑N









Xij = Ai ∀i = 1, 2, . . .,  N
N
i=1
Xij = Aj ∀j = 1, 2, . . .,  N
ij > 0 ∀ i, j where integer function 1 equals one only if bank i lends to
ank j, and zero otherwise. This problem, however, is computation-
lly expensive to solve. The authors propose a heuristic to solve this
roblem, which involves the smooth value function, V(X), which is
igh whenever the network X has a few links and satisfies the asset
nd liability constraints. The second input is the set of prior beliefs, Stability 35 (2018) 107–119
Qij, which assumes that each small bank prefers to match its lending
and funding needs for a large bank (dissasortative mixing).
B.2 Bara
In Baral and Fique (2012), the authors use a bivariate copula to
estimate adjacency matrices. A copula is a multivariate distribution
where the complex interdependencies between banks can be easily
summarized using marginal distributions.
The copula is constructed as follows. First, the authors assume
the copula to be of the Gumbel type, which is often used in extreme
value theory. The authors construct the empirical distribution for
the aggregate lending and borrowing of banks using the avail-
able data. This distribution is transformed into a copula using a
maximum-likelihood method. The copula density function is




(− ln Ai) + (− ln Aj)
])
where  is the estimated dependency parameter. The copula
matrix is the prior fed into the maximum entropy method. The
exposures are then re-scaled to ensure that the aggregate lending
and borrowing constraints for each bank are satisfied.
B.3 Dreh
Drehmann and Tarashev (2013) generate a series of high-
concentration networks by perturbing the network produced by
the maximum entropy method. The authors begin with the stan-
dard prior assumption that the exposure between banks i and j is
equal to AiLj. They subsequently treat each element of the prior
matrix Qij as a uniformly distributed random variable over the
interval [0, 2AiLj]. After generating a series of prior matrices, the
authors use the standard maximum entropy to rescale and deter-
mine the exposures.
B.4 Hala
Halaj and Kok (2013) introduce an iterative algorithm to gener-
ate a series of networks. At the initial step 0, the matrix X0 has all
entries equal to 0 and the unmatched interbank assets and liabili-
ties are initiated as A0 : = A and L0 : L. At a step k + 1 a pair of banks
(i, j) is drawn at random, where all pairs have an equal probability
of being selected. Next, a random number f is drawn from the unit
interval and indicates the percentage of bank i’s liabilities that are
serviced by bank j. The exposure Xk+1
ij
is updated as follows:
Xk+1
ij
= Xkij + f k+1 min{Lik, Akj }















The stock of interbank liabilities and assets reduces as the volume
of the assigned (matched) placements increases. The procedure is
repeated until no more interbank liabilities are left to be assigned
as placements from one bank to another.
B.5 Cimi
Cimini et al. (2015) present a model that is similar to the Musm
method of Musmeci et al. (2013), but with some important dif-
ferences. First, both methods generate adjacency matrices from
so-called fitness models. However, in Musm the matrices are undi-
rected, while for Cimi, they are directed. Second, for assigning the
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xposure assignment also follows a fitness model. Importantly, the
ggregate exposure constraints are not always satisfied for indi-
idual reconstructed networks under Cimi. Instead, the constraints
re binding only when we take an average over a large number of
econstructed networks.
.6 Musm
Musmeci et al. (2013) develop a bootstrap method to recon-
truct financial networks. At the core of their method is a ‘fitness’
odel, which postulates that the probability of a bank acquiring
inks is proportional to its fitness. Formally, if banks i and j have fit-




1 + zf ifj
,
here the endogenous parameter z captures how binding the
ggregate exposure constraints will be.
The method proceeds as follows. First, from the aggregate
ending and borrowing constraints of banks, the parameter z is
stimated. Second, using the probabilities pij, a series of adjacency
atrices are sampled. Finally, the exposures are determined using
he standard maximum entropy method.
ppendix C. Description of metrics
Table 7 reports the network statistics we compute for the orig-
nal networks.
able 7
ummary of network statistics.
Metric Short description
Number of links Number of undirected links in the network
Density Number of undirected links as a percentage of the total
number of links (excluding self-loops)
Average degree Average of undirected links of the nodes in the network
Median degree Median of undirected links of the nodes in the network
Assortativity Preference for a network’s nodes to attach to others
that are similar. Here, similarity is expressed in terms
of a node’s degree. A high assortativity implies that
highly connected nodes tend to be connected with
other high degree nodes
Clustering The degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster
together. In a undirected setting, this is defined as the
number of closed triplets (any three nodes with links
between all three) over the total number of triplets
(also including triplets with one link missing)
Lender / borrower
dependency
Average of the market share of the largest borrower or
lender, respectively, over total borrowing and lending.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (mean and
median) of both assets and liabilities. It is defined as
the sum of the squared “market shares”.
Core size Percentage of banks classified as belonging to the core
Error score The percentage of the actual links in violation of the
perfect core-periphery structure
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